Humanities & Social Sciences
December 2007
NATO strategy, détente and European integration
Speaking at West Point in 1962, Dean Acheson observed that Britain had lost an empire and had still to find a new role. This book explains why, in the following years, as Britain's Labour government contemplated withdrawal from east of Suez, ministers came to see that Britain's future role would be as a force within Europe. To this end, and in order to gain entry into the European Economic Community, a close relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany would be essential. This account of Anglo-German relations during the 1960s reveals fascinating insights into how both governments reacted to a series of complex issues and why, despite differences which might have led to strains, a good understanding was maintained. Terry Macintyre's innovative approach brings together material covering NATO strategy, détente and European integration, making the volume fascinating and essential reading for students and enthusiasts of contemporary British and German political history.
This book makes an important contribution to what we know about Cold War history, and should help to redefine some of the views about the relationship between Britain and Germany during the 1960s. ;
